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Game theory, in its non-cooperative as well as in its coopera-tive form, has acquired a central role in modern economics.
ln the analysis of strategic interactions it proved superior to the
traditional mathematical methods used in economic theory. This
paper deals with the two major concepts in game theory introdu-
ced by John Nash, namely, Nash equilibrium, and Nash bargain-
ing solution, the elaboration of which brought John Nash the No-
bel Prize in Economics in 1994. In spite of its relative mathemat-
ical sophistication, game theory has found numerous applicati-ons
in real life economic situations where strategic interactions are in-
volved.
INTRODUCTION
Game theory, as a mathematical method for analyzing strategic interacti-ons, has acquired a central role in economic theory. The Nobel Jury has re-
cognized that influence by awarding the 1994 economics prize to three of the
leading contributors to equilibrium analysis in non-cooperative game theory:
John Harsanyi of the University of California at Berkeley, John Nash of Prince-
ton University, and Reinhard Selten of the University of Bonn.
John Nash, whose name is attached to the concepts presented in this paper,
was born in 1928. He entered the Princeton doctoral program in 1948, and got
his Ph.D. in 1950 for his remarkable doctoral dissertation entitled Non-coop-
erative Games. This article attempts to give an account of the two major con-
cepts in game theory introduced by John Nash, namely Nash equilibrium, and
Nash bargaining solution. The elaboration of these concepts follows a brief hi-
story of game theory, and a review of some of its fundamental concepts.
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF GAME THEORY
The history of game theory may claim to go back to 1713, when the mathe-
matician James Waldegrave, in a letter to P. de Montrnort, introduced the noti-
on of a mixed strategy, and the minimax principle as he analyzed, and gave a
solution to the card game called 'le Her' (Baumol-Goldfeld, 1968).
Emile Borel, one of the main creators of mathematics in the 20lh century, had
proved particular instances of the minimax theorem in the restrictive case of
symmetric games (von Neumann, 1953). He also conjectured that it did not
generally hold. However, in his pathbreaking article of 1928, which marked the
beginning of the contemporary period for game theory, John von Neumann ga-
ve the first proof of the minimax theorem for an arbitrary finite payoff matrix in
a zero-sum two-person game showing that the theorem does generally hold
(von Neumann, 1928).
As it usually happens in mathematics, von Neumann's initially complex proof
was later replaced by simpier arguments. Two decades later it evolved into a
demonstration whose main ideas could be conveyed to a bright high school
student (Gale, 1951).
Little happened in game theory from 1928 to 1944 when the economics pro-
fession was hit by the 625 page book Theory of Games and Economic Behav-
ior by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. Even after that, at first, sig-
nificant events rarely occurred in game theory. The book by von Neumann and
Morgenstern focused on the concept of a solution, now called a stable set, a
concept that did not meet with success. Their volume did not emphasize the
notions, many of them not yet discovered, that came to dominate game theo-
ry: Nash equilibrium, Shapley value, the core, etc. It took several decades af-
ter 1944 for game theory to start acquiring the influence on economic theory it
now has.
After the publication of the book of 1944 that, unlike the article of 1928, could
not be ignored, the earliest major contribution was made in 1950 by John Nash
(Nash, 1950)(i). In a one-page paper that was remarkable by its scientific con-
tribution and by its conciseness, Nash introduced, in the new context of game
theory, a concept of equilibrium to which his name is attached, and proved its
existence for all finite games. In doing so, he used a mathematical result (the
Kakutani fixed point theorem) which, for many years, became the basic ana-
lytical tool for establishing that a social system has an equilibrium, whatever
precise definition of the concept of an equilibrium is adopted.
THE CONCEPT OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM
The situation considered by Nash can be presented as follows: If we denote
by n the number of players in a game, and if we characterize each one of them
by an index i running from 1 to n, we observe a particular player, say the i-th
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one. That player has to decide on which action to take, what decision to make.
ln game theory terminology, he has to choose a strategy Si in a given set Si of
strategies that are available to him. Once every player has made his choice,
namely S1, an element of S1, for the first one; S2, an element of S2, for the sec-
ond one; ... ; Sn, an element of Sn, for the n-th one, the resulting global choice
for the game is the n-list S= (S1, S2, ... , Sn). The problem becomes to find an Si
which forms an equilibrium, i.e., a combination of strategies in which every one
of the n players considers himself to be in equilibrium, and has, therefore, no
incentiveto select a different strategy.
We can consider anyone of those players, the i-th one as before. That player
is in equilibrium, according to Nash, if taking the strategies (S1, ... , Si-1, Si+1, ... s
Sn) of the n-1 other players as given, he reacts optimally to such a combina-
tion. It means that by choosing Si in the given set Si of available strategies, he
maximizes his payoff, l.e., his utility. It is represented by a number that de-
pends on the choices made by the n players: by himself, and by the others. In
symbols Si must maximize W(S1, ... , Si-1, Si, Si+1, ... s Sn) where S1, ... , Si-1, Si+1, ... ,
Sn are given by the global choice s/being considered, but where Si can be cho-
sen freely in the set Si by the i-th player, W(S1, ... , Si-1, Si, Si+1, ... , Sn) = Max W(S1,
... , Si-1, Si, Si+1, ... , Sn)
SiE Si
If we denote by N the set of the n players, and by NV the set of the n-1 play-
ers including every one of them except the i-th, then the (n-1)-list (S1, ... , Si-1,
Si+1, ... s Sn) can be denoted by SNV, and the last equality can be written in a more
compact way as
ui (SNV, si)=Max ui (SNV, Si)
Si E Si
ln this expression the (n-1)-list SNV is given. The variable is the strategy Si con-
strained only to be an element of Si. The i-th player is in equilibrium if Si is a
maximizer of Ui(SNV, Si) in the set si. That best reaction strategy, however, may
not be unique. The set of optimal reactions is, therefore, Mi (SMi) , a set which
depends on the strategies chosen by the n-1 players in NV. The i-th player is
in equilibrium if his chosen strategy Si is an element of the set Mi (SNV). In sym-
bols, if
The global choice S is a Nash equilibrium if every one of the n players is in
equilibrium in this sense, Le., if
for every i =1, ... , n, si E Mi (SNIi).
ln non-technical terms, the decisions made by the players in the game form a
Nash equilibrium if every one of them, considering the decisions made by the
others as given, cannot increase his utility by changing his own decision.
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Augustin Cournot had given a similar definition in 1838 (Cournot, 1838), and
the equilibrium concept of 1838-1950 is sometimes called a Cournot-Nash equi-
librium. But Nash introduced the concept in the context of game theory where
the decision to be made by each one of the n players is the choice under un-
certainty of a mixed strategy, Le., a probability distribution over his set of pure
strategies. Nash then proved with great generality and elegance that every ga-
me with a finite number of players, every one of them having a finite number
of pure strategies, has an equilibrium. By proving the existence of an equilib-
rium, his result contributed powerfully to its wide use.
Nash's proof also had mathematical depth, which, unlike von Neumann's proof
of the minimax theorem in 1928, was necessary for his result. It introduced in-
to the social sciences a theorem (Kakutani's fixed point theorem) which be-
came a standard means of establishing the existence of a General Equilibrium
in economic theory.
A Nash equilibrium was proved by him to be a fixed point of a suitable trans-
formation M. Let S be the cartesian product
S = S1 X S2 X .... X Sn
of the set of strategies of the n players, S1 for the first, S2 for the second, ..... ,
Sn for the n-th. An n-list s = (S1, ... , Sn) of the strategies chosen by those n play-
ers is an element of S,
S ES.
The set of optimal reactions of the first player to the strategies (S2, ... , Sn) = SM1
of the others has been defined as M1 (SNl1). Similarly, one has for the second
player M2 (SNl2) , .... , and for the n-th, Mn (SNIn). The transformation M is defined
by
M(s) = M1(SM1) X M2(SM2) X .... X Mn (SMn).
lt carries an element S of S into the cartesian product M(s) of M1 (SM1), a sub-
set of S1; Mz(SM2) , a subset of S2; ... ; Mn (SMn), a subset of Sn. The set M(s) is
a subset of S:
M(s) e S.
Now S is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for every j = 1, ... , n, Si E Mi (SN\i) , Le.,
if and only if
S E M(s)
Thus S is a Nash equilibrium if and only if it belongs to its image M(s) by the
transformation M, Le., if and only if it is a fixed point of the transformation M of
S into itself. Kakutani's theorem gives conditions under which such a transfor-
mation has a fixed point. Therefore, Nash had to check that in the game situ-
ation that he considered, those conditions were satisfied.
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THE CONCEPT OF NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION
Also in 1950, Nash proposed another concept, that of a bargaining solution,
which became associated with his name as well (Nash, 1950)(ii). Nash now con-
siders two interacting individuals. The utility levels that they reach are denoted
by U1 for the first and by U2 for the second. The situation that they face can be
represented in a two dimensional utility space whose coordinates are U1 as
the abscissa and U2 as the ordinate. Some points u = (Ut, U2) are attainable by
the two participants. Others are out of their reach.
Let A be the set of attainable utility points. If the two individuals agree on a
point of A, they each obtain the utility levels that are the coordinates of that
point. If they do not agree, the disagreement point d is the result. Clearly d,
too, is an element of A. Nash asks what point of A should two rational individ-
uals agree upon. Since their utility functions are von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility functions, the set A is convex. To see this, let u and v be two points in A,
u = (Ut, U2) and v = (111, Y.2). One has to show that, given any number a such
that O s a s 1, the point au + (1-a) v is also in A. Clearly, if the first participant
can attain U1 and V1, he can also attain eu- + (1-a) V1 by doing with probability
a what yielded U1, and with probability 1-a what yielded 111. Similarly, the sec-
ond participant can attain aU2 + (1-a) Y.2.
The two utility functions of the two participants, also because they are von
Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, are determined by the two underlying prefer-
ences only up to two increasing linear transformations. U1 (.) can be replaced
by k1U1 (.) + 11,.and U2 (.) can be replaced by k2U2 (.) + 12, where k, and kz are
positive, and these replacements are immaterial for any concept that is deter-
mined by the preferences of the two participants. The solution that Nash pro-
poses satisfies those conditions.
Two rational individuals should not agree on a point of A that is weakly domi-
nated by another point of A for which 111:2: ut and V2:2: U2, at least one of the two
inequalities being strict. Nash's solution, therefore, is Pareto optimal and is re-
stricted to the North-East boundary of A.
Nash also postulates that if the two participants have agreed on the solution s
= (S1, S2), and if the set of attainable utility points A is now restricted to a sub-
set A' of A in such a way that s is still an element of A', then s is a solution for
the new situation described by A'. Indeed, if an agreement was reached on the
point s, and s is still attainable after the restriction from A to A', then the two
participants should keep agreeing on s.
Apparently equally innocuaus is the symmetry axiom according to which a set
A having the 45-degree line as a symmetry axis treats the two participants
symmetrically. The solution on which they agree must be a point on the 45-de-
gree line. 8ypassing points that are inessentiai for the present purpose, one
can show that the Nash solution is obtained by maximizing the product
(u1-d1)( u2-d2)
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where u = (Ut, U2) belongs to the given convex set A, and d = (dt, d2) is the giv-
en disagreement point.'
CONCLUSION
John Nash has made a lasting impact on the theory of games. His contributi-
ons (which the preceding brief and partial account only attempted to illustrate)
to the non-cooperative game theory where binding agreements are not feasi-
ble and to cooperative game theory where such agreements are feasible, are
remarkable by their scientific impact, but also by the fact that they were made
more than 40 years ago, in a span of three years.
ln spite of its relative mathematical sophistication, non-cooperative game the-
ory has found numerous applications in real life economic situations where stra-
tegic interactions are involved, from the analysis of competitive behavior of oli-
gopolistic firms to labor negotiations, economic policy issues, government reg-
ulations, international trade, etc. The concept of equilibrium introduced by Nash
which is used to make predictions about the outcome of such interactions was
later refined by his other two colleagues with whom Nash is sharing the 1994
Nobel prize for economics.
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Teoriji igre, njezinom nekooperativnom kao i kooperativnom ob-liku, dana je središnja uloga u suvremenoj ekonomskoj zna-
nosti. U analizi strateških međudjelovanja pokazala se nadmoć-
nom u odnosu na tradicionalne matematičke metode koje se ko-
riste u ekonomskoj teoriji. Ovaj tekst bavi se dvjema glavnim kon-
cepcijama u teoriji igre koje je uveo John Nash, a to su Nashov
ekvilibrij i Nashovo pogodbeno rješenje, čija je razrada Nashu do-
nijela Nobelovu nagradu za ekonomiju 1994. godine. Unatoč raz-
mjernoj matematičkoj složenosti, teorija igre našla je svoju prim-
jenu u brojnim svakodnevnim ekonomskim situacijama strateškog
međudjelovanja.
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Die zeitgen6ssische 6konomische Wissenschaft gesteht derSpieltheorie sowohl in ihrer nicht-kooperativen als auch ko-
operativen Form eine zentrale Rolle zu. Die Analyse strategischer
Interaktionen hat ihre Oberlegenheit in Bezug auf tradition elle ma-
thematische Methoden, die in der 6konomischen Theorie ange-
wandt werden, erwiesen. Vorliegender Aufsatz beschaftiqt sich mit
zwei Hauptkonzeptionen innerhalb der Spieltheorie, die von John
Nash eingefOhrt wurden: Nashs Aquilibrium und Nashs Kompro-
missl6sung, die dem Autor 1994 den Nobelpreis fur 6konomische
Wissenschaften eingebracht haben. Trotz ihrer relativ gro(l,en ma-
thematischen Komplexitat kommt die Spieltheorie in zahlreichen stra-
tegischen Interaktionen des 6konomischen A1ltags zur Anwendung.
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